Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan gave an interview to Petros Ghazaryan on December 19. The full transcript of the interview is presented below.

Petros Ghazaryan - Good evening dear viewers. We continue to follow the highlights. Today we will try to summarize the year with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Good evening Mr. Pashinyan, thank you for accepting the invitation. Mr. Pashinyan, I was watching your meeting with your teammates, and you said there that you have been thinking a lot, and the public is also thinking about how the "Civil Contract" Party managed to win the parliamentary elections after the 44-day war. And you say that the formula is that you were accused not of what you were guilty of, and you were accused of something, when you were guilty of something else. Will you open the brackets?

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan - Thank you for the question. Yes, I made such a statement at the meeting with the group of activists of the "Civil Contract" party in Tavush region. What I said is very direct and refers to the following: if you remember after the 44 day war of 2020 and even before that, we were accused of selling the lands, etc. That accusation meants that we sold, surrendered, etc., that is, deep down it means that we did not make efforts to preserve or protect the rights of Armenia, or protect the rights of Nagorno Karabakh and so on, the accusation is in that context.

I meant that if there is an accusation that is objective or somehow objective, it should be about something else, that until that point we had not talked with the people, to put it very bluntly, about our ideas about Nagorno Karabakh, I mean, Armenian ideas, and about the impossibility of fulfilling wishes. That is, when I say we are accused of something we are not really guilty of, we are not accused of something we can or are more likely to be guilty of. But this also has a reason: why do not they accused us? Because in this case the accusation will be more blurred, making it the addressee of much larger circles. In other words, it will become much more difficult to direct the accusation to an indivivual. This is what I said. Was I able to make my point clear?

Petros Ghazaryan - In other words, you came to power and after seeing and mastering the real situation, you realized that what you had imagined and the reality that exists are not compatible with each other, and you did not speak about it.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan - It is very important to record that this was not an event that happened in one day. However, we can now talk about it in 10 minutes, half an hour or an hour, but drawing that conclusion is a certain process and we have to record that that process is political, that process is conscious, that process is subconscious, that process is emotional, that process is geopolitical, that process is regional and so on. I mean, it's not like we came, looked and draw a conclusion.

But by and large, yes, we can do that too, and so, since I suggested the topic myself, I guess the question arises, why wasn't all that communicated, why nothing was said about that? For a very simple reason, because also for the government, also for any political force in general, in order to say, look, this, this, this is not happening, you have to make a proposal at the end: so what to do? And it was this socio-psychological, conscious, subconscious impossibility that actually put us in front of the situation. Moreover, this impossibility is not only about the fact that, as a result, negative processes will begin in the Republic of Armenia, instability, etc.

This is not the problem at all, the problem is that I personally and the representatives of our political team, like thousands or tens of thousands of citizens of the Republic of Armenia, had an internal problem with putting up with all that. That's the whole point. I mean, it's not like we said it for ourselves, we came to terms with it, but we just hid it from the public. We inside our souls, personally I did not come to terms with it because there was no alternative. Now imagine if we came to power and we tell the people that this is the situation, dear people. But the important responsibility of the government and the leader is to offer a solution. And what do we do: a) we return the territories, b) we nulify the current status of Nagorno-Karabakh, c) there is no certainty about the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh, moreover, certain is what has already been accepted in the highest international institutions.

You know, there is such a thing as a wise leader, a wise politician. If we proceed from the logic of a wise politician, already in 2019 the record of a wise politician should theoretically have been this: the 7 territories should be handed over, the current status of Nagorno Karabakh should be brought to zero. Why and how? I will tell later why and how, at least an Armenian-Azerbaijani joint administration should be established in Nagorno Karabakh, and the issue of the status of Nagorno Karabakh will not be determined until the Azerbaijanis are the majority in Nagorno Karabakh.

When they say a wise politician, what do they mean? They mean that he can predict what will happen and act accordingly. But, therefore, even after these 4 records, the 5th question would come. Well, what will happen after all this, for example, will the events of Sev Lake take place or not? Will the events of Sotk-Khoznavar take place or will they not take place? Will the events of Tegh take place or not? That is, I want us to understand the depth of the problem to this degree. And the second, in fact, to face the need to collapse the 30-year-old Armenian narrative, that is, the discourse, and still not having the answer to the question.

Well, what happened, what I have listed, did it happen because the government or the authorities betrayed, destroyed the Armenian discourse and did not take steps to protect the vision that exists, that is, why did it happen this way? Or the contrary, it turned out that way because it had to turn out that way? When I said in the National Assembly that we would have the same thing, but without the victims, I never understood why there was a fuss about that statement, because this is what I meant.

Petros Ghazaryan - Mr. Prime Minister, you are right that it was not possible to record it in one day, and it is a process, but the process starts somewhere. In that case, when you felt that the situation was like this, what should have been your steps? a) to prepare the society, because the society was not ready, you say, emotionally, to face the truth...

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan - We don't know what the truth is...

Petros Ghazaryan - You said that you started to realize what was happening.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan - No, not to realize, but to see. But the truth is not only that, the truth is to put future events on the rails of predictability, because telling the truth means to know the truth. I want to draw your attention to that I said, ok, we did all this, we put up with the situation, what will the future events be like?

I want to draw your attention to a very important circumstance, an extremely important circumstance, and I don't know if I will be able to reveal the depth of this circumstance during this conversation, or if other conversations will be needed for that. In the negotiation process of the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh issue, there has never been such an option that offered a solution to the Nagorno Karabakh issue, there was no such option. Let me put it this way, since the Madrid principles, all the options that have been on the table have assumed the non-resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh issue. In other words, there has been no document which, after being signed, would be considered to have resolved the Nagorno Karabakh issue. Moreover, there was such an option only in 1999, when if being signed, it could be said that the NK issue would be resolved. It was the option of exchanging Meghri and Nagorno-Karabakh, by which the issue would be solved, would be closed. In other words, Meghri region is handed over to Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh is joined to Armenia. It was the only option by which it was possible to record that we would solve the Nagorno Karabakh issue, no other option offered solution, recorded resolution to the Nagorno Karabakh issue.

And this, in my understanding, was done specifically in a way so that the NK issue could always be held as a bludgeon over the head of the Republic of Armenia. I don't know, maybe some people were also thinking the same could be said for Azerbaijan, but now I am talking about Armenia and I want to talk about Armenia. I have said before, the impossibility of clarifying where the process will stop, because if you have a predictable environment or the ability to make the process predictable, you can discuss and make a decision, but if you do not know or there is absolutely no possibility to make the process predictable, what you say becomes practically impossible.

Petros Ghazaryan - But, nevertheless, a politician must take steps, right? No matter what else we have been talking about for 30 years. Shouldn't you have changed your narrative under those circumstances? But you were still speaking that emotional, patriotic speech, which you mentioned. You should have met with the former leaders to have a consensus, you should have said, dears, our fight is an internal fight, but we have such a situation and no one can face it all alone, let's see what we do, etc. Steps that were not taken.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan - Actually, they were done with a slightly different logic, because if you remember, I proposed, so to speak, national consensuses, the main purpose of which was to consolidate and unite around the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. It did not work out because later on the calculations and reality showed the following: look, as for involving the potential of the diaspora that we talk so much and love to talk about, here there is also a question of hiding the truth, but I think the truth should be told there too. Let me give a very simple example: since 1990 or 1991, if we look at the mechanism of the Hayastan All-Armenian Fund, I think the Hayastan All-Armenian Fund was founded in 1992, and until 2018, even 2020, to give an example, the funds donated from the diaspora are 3, 4, 5 times less than the increase in revenues of the Armenian state budget from 2018 to 2022. Changing that narrative, yes, but replacing that narrative with what? This is the whole problem, to replace and essentially say that the NK issue is closed, there is no NK issue.

But in this case, a very important question must be answered: very well, even if we record it, and then? The lack of certainties or the impossibility of determining the future is the most important factor, because in the case of referring to the future, it is necessary to review all the formulas that are based on the statehood of Armenia, starting with regional relations, ending with international relations, security systems and so on. In other words, in that situation, why didn’t the narrative change? I say again, let's put aside the fact that it's not like we woke up one morning and this whole thing came into being. It is the result of certain processes, relations, events, conversations, discussions, when you understand that the action you mentioned means not only about Nagorno-Karabakh, but also in general, to ruin the entire discourse, concept, and content that is the foundation of Armenian statehood. A mission that no sane person will undertake, not because he is afraid, but a vacuum will be formed between ruining and building a new one.

Processes will take place during that vacuum. These processes are unpredictable, and most importantly, are these unpredictable processes reversible or irreversible? And no one can answer that question. Nobody can. Could I explain my point? In other words, did it happen because we destroyed that concept or did it happen because the concept itself is no longer viable? Yes, you are right, we had to make a choice. What was my choice? To consolidate forces, to try to defend what we reasonably believed in. You talked about contacts with the previous leaderships.

Petros Ghazaryan - But you continued their emotional line.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan - That emotional line was not theirs, let's start with that, because we all were under the influence of that emotional line.

Petros Ghazaryan – We all were under it?

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan - Yes, because "we all were under it’s influence" is important, because I ended up here, we all ended up here with our perceptions of this environment. It is very important to note that when we talk about a concept, we are talking about a structure. Now we are talking to each other about the need to ruin that structure. That's not even the problem. The problem is, first, what events would happen in that case, and would those events happen because the government came and destroyed the concept, or would they happen because the concept was not viable? No one could answer that question.

Petros Ghazaryan - But look, during our meeting, you said that starting from Lisbon, it was clear that not only the return of the territories, but also the abolition of state institutions was put on the table.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan - If I'm not mistaken, I said something else about Lisbon. Let me refer to that chronology again and go into that last piece, which I've never touched on before, I will do it in detail now. I mean, I touched on it at the Investigative Committee, but very vaguely.

Look what happened? In 1993, the UN Security Council resolutions were adopted, where several points were recorded. According to those points, Nagorno Karabakh was considered the territory of Azerbaijan by those resolutions. That's how it is written: Nagorno Karabakh region of Azerbaijan. Second, acquisitions made by force were considered illegal. The principle of inviolability of borders and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan was recorded. Let's put this aside. In 1994, the ceasefire comes and the negotiation process begins. In 1996, the OSCE Lisbon summit takes place. During this period, the concept of the Nagorno Karabakh issue is based on the right to self-determination. What was the 1996 Lisbon summit about? The Lisbon summit of 1996, which is expressed by the chairman's statement, records the following: it says that the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh should be resolved by exercising the right to self-determination, that is, Nagorno-Karabakh should receive autonomy within Azerbaijan. In other words, according to the results of the 1996 Lisbon Summit, the international community said what the right to self-determination means in the case of Nagorno Karabakh.

I have not had a chance to check whether it is now a public document or not. I assume that it is in the OSCE documents. After which, the Madrid principles of 2007 came, the problems related to which I have previously raised.

Now, why do I say that the process of dissolution of the state order in Nagorno Karabakh had already begun with the negotiation content we inherited in 2018? Because I say that in the negotiation process in August 2016, and please pay attention to the years, after the 4-day war of April 2016, in August, a third document appears in the negotiation content, which is about the following, that the UN Security Council, in consultation with the UN Secretary General, Armenia, Azerbaijan and OSCE officials, will determine the ways in which Nagorno Karabakh should organize its own life. And this will be the recognized status of Nagorno-Karabakh until the final status is decided.

What was the need for this document? And what was the reason behind this document? The problem is that Azerbaijan and, in fact, the co-chairs together with Azerbaijan also recorded that Kazan document's provision that Nagorno Karabakh receives an intermediate status cannot be expressed in the way Armenia wants it. The perception of the Armenian side in Kazan was that Nagorno-Karabakh, which existed as of 2011, receives an intermediate status. In other words, the existing status of Nagorno Karabakh is recorded as an intermediate status. What exists, the status quo of Nagorno-Karabakh, is recorded as an intermediate status. Azerbaijan rejects this, and in 2016, since the idea of an intermediate status exists in the Madrid principles, the third document in this package appears, which addresses the issue of the intermediate status of Nagorno Karabakh.

What has changed here in the meantime? The following has changed: if Kazan's logic is that this situation in Nagorno-Karabakh is recorded as an intermediate status, in August 2016 it is recorded that we should go to the UN Security Council, discuss there how Nagorno-Karabakh should organize its life, and that will be the intermediate status. In other words, this implies that since everything will be decided by the UN Security Council from scratch, the status that Nagorno-Karabakh has will be nullified, and the UN Security Council, in consultation with Azerbaijan, Armenia, the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, the UN Secretary General and a number of subjects, will establish new ways, methods and mechanisms for how Nagorno-Karabakh will to organize life․

Now what is important here? Returning to the Madrid Principles, two major advantages of the Madrid Principles were cited by those bringing the Madrid Principles to the negotiation table. First, the status of Nagorno-Karabakh will be determined in a referendum to be held within the terms agreed upon by the parties. This seems like a very good thing. But Azerbaijan used this provision, by the way, Azerbaijan needed this provision for that to nullify the referendum of December 10, 1991 and the declaration and referendum of the independence of Nagorno Karabakh, because if the status should be decided in the future referendum, it means that status was not recorded in the previously held referendum.

Second, Azerbaijan needed and used the provision of intermediate status recorded by the Madrid principles. Look, he says, Nagorno-Karabakh gets an intermediate status. Azerbaijan used the referendum clause to nullify the 1991 status quo. And he used the intermediate status to nullify the existing status of Karabakh, taking it to the UN Security Council to start from scratch. And a question may arise of why it should be started from scratch, because it was recorded in the Madrid principles that Azerbaijanis have as many rights as Armenians have in all processes related to Nagorno Karabakh. If we are talking about the organization of life in Nagorno Karabakh, then the organization of that life concerns not only Armenians, but also Azerbaijanis.

Petros Ghazaryan - Mr. Prime Minister, this means that the movement, which was laid at the foundation of the independence of our state, was not the right direction in a big sense?

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan - You know, I wouldn't have formulated the question like that. I would formulate it differently, citing also a number of theses recently put forward by our opponents.

Look, we should pay more attention to words, sentences, concepts in general. When we go back to the years 1990-1991 and follow the narrative of the people who eventually led the Republic of Armenia to independence, we witness a number of surprising and strange facts. What I will say now is related to what was said a little while ago. What do I mean? I mean by the narrative of 1990-1991, we find that the leaders, or at least some of them, are not saying that we need independence because we want a state, because we want to be a state nation, etc., but they are saying that we need independence, we need an independent state to solve the Nagorno Karabakh issue. Here, do you understand the most important issue?

By the way, why am I saying this after the last statements of the opposition, because the spokesmen of the opposition, when recently, I don't remember on what occasion, made the following statement, they said: the existence of the Republic of Armenia makes no sense without the Nagorno Karabakh issue, because the Republic of Armenia was created to solve the Nagorno Karabakh issue. But I want to go back to the very beginning: if the statehood of Armenia was created to solve the Nagorno Karabakh issue, what should be after any resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh issue? What was it supposed to be? The Republic of Armenia should have lost the meaning of its existence. In other words, if we look purely, so to speak, with if-then logic, we are able to explain, right? If the Republic of Armenia was created for the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh issue, what should be the fate of the Republic of Armenia after the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh issue? And I want to refer to the events of September 2023 in this context, because if we are very attentive, it seems to me that we will find the answer to the question I asked a little while ago.

Petros Ghazaryan – You are preventing me from asking a question. Did all that, everything you described, imply not to see the truth, did it imply the depopulation of Karabakh?

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan - Let me finish my thoughts with my logic and then address your question. The question is as follows: if the Republic of Armenia is created, or was created, for the solution of the Nagorno Karabakh issue, for any solution, then what should happen in the next moment of the solution of the Nagorno Karabakh issue?

In this sense, the September events have a very significant, conceptual significance. When due to the events known to you, moreover, I want to emphasize the fact that the Armenian government did everything to prevent Nagorno Karabakh from being de-Armenianized in the sense that the idea was constantly promoted by some that people should leave, people should leave there. We did everything we could to prevent it from happening, and we also tried to prevent it from happening with statements that were criticized. But I want to say that the people who planned and carried out the depopulation of Nagorno Karabakh, and in this sense, even negatively viewed, it could be perceived as a solution to the Nagorno Karabakh issue, those parallel processes that took place in Armenia, from outside Armenia, but related to Armenia, give the answer to my question.

Petros Ghazaryan - Which processes are you talking about?

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan - The processes, including calls from other countries for a change of power in Armenia, etc. Here is the culmination and the answer of the question, because those people who made those calls, they considered that the issue of Nagorno Karabakh was solved by the ethnic cleansing of Nagorno Karabakh. And therefore, the issue of the Republic of Armenia should also be resolved. In other words, a marionette government must be established in Armenia, which would say: it turned out that the existence of the Republic of Armenia is no longer meaningful.

Petros Ghazaryan - Is it true that at that time you were called and told that you should attack Azerbaijan?

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan - There was no such conversation. No. There have been other conversations that could mean and maybe if we move from a conceptual level to a practical level, yes, we can interpret it that way.

Petros Ghazaryan - Mr. Prime Minister, during that meeting, you also said that parallel to these processes, we were constantly told from another country that we don't need an army, we don't need schools, we don't need roads, and they will provide our security. Why do we need to strengthen our capabilities? Do you think this is done on purpose?

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan - We usually raise parts of the conclusions in our public speeches, but the processes that led to these conclusions, of course, some of them remain secret, some remain top secret, some are of special importance. Sometimes there are types of information that won't be disclosed for the next 50 years. But I want to say again, because people change all the time in countries, governments change and so on, we have to look at the deeper meanings and ongoing policies.

And yes, by saying all this, I say it was done on purpose. Also, what am I saying this? This is related to what I said a while ago, that any proposal for the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh issue did not mean the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh issue. We must record this idea. In other words, let's assume we signed a paper, any of the possible papers, except for one, we will come back to this one, no paper was ever on the table, signing which would meant a solution to the Nagorno Karabakh issue. All of them, without exception, indicated that the Nagorno Karabakh issue is moving from stage X to stage Y. And the probabilities of war, clashes and ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh have never decreased. If you have any questions, and if you have the time or desire for me to specify what I mean by this, I can specify that as well.

Petros Ghazaryan – Briefly, please.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan - For example, the provision that the status of Nagorno-Karabakh will be determined by a referendum to be held in a period agreed between the parties. We are signing this, but it means that the Nagorno Karabakh issue has not been resolved, the Nagorno Karabakh issue will be resolved in the future. Next, Nagorno Karabakh will receive an intermediate status. How? We will go to the UN Security Council and discuss. For example, the UN Security Council decides that there should be an elected representative body in Nagorno-Karabakh, 30 percent should be Azerbaijanis, 70 percent Armenians, for example, or it could decide that 50 percent should be Azerbaijanis and 50 percent Armenians.

This means a new conflict, because no one in Armenia or in Azerbaijan would be satisfied with the UN Security Council’s decision. Yes, of course, international peacekeeping forces would be deployed. International peacekeeping forces were also deployed in Kosovo, and what happened?

Petros Ghazaryan - Mr. Prime Minister, your opponents say: if you knew all this so deeply, how bad our situation is, why did you include the theses of Shushi, bringing back Hadrut, remedial secession in your pre-election promises? Why did you bring those theses?

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan - During the 2021 elections, it was about the opportunity of the Armenian population in those settlements to live there. But you can say that there was a point about the right to self-determination of Nagorno Karabakh in the pre-election program. Let me say why.

And it was pursuing that provision of the pre-election program that we came, reviewed again, reconsidered again, including the 1996 Lisbon summit. What I said was that we had to lower the benchmark because we wanted to align our understanding of self-determination with the international community's understanding of self-determination. Where are the ideas of the international community about the self-determination of Nagorno Karabakh? These are the insights from the 1996 Lisbon summit.

We said, people, we are pursuing the right to self-determination, but since our benchmark is here, the international community's benchmark is there, we have to lower our benchmark, try to at least bring it closer to the benchmark that the international community imagines. In this case, we will ensure international consolidation around Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Recently, the opposition has been saying: why was this consolidation not achieved? For a very simple reason, because when I announced, we announced the lowering of the benchmark, after holding preliminary consultations with the representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh, after that the benchmarks in Nagorno-Karabakh were even raised a little more, with the statements of the Parliament, political forces, etc.

Petros Ghazaryan - In his last press conference, Putin said that it was Armenia that gave up Nagorno Karabakh. You announced that Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan. Moreover, you did it surprisingly, without informing Russia about it.

First, the topic has been discussed a lot, at least after September 2022. But let's really inventory the processes, actually inventory them. When in November and December 2020, the President of the Russian Federation announced that Nagorno-Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan, those statements are public, those statements are still on social networks today, in the video version, I learned from the press that the Russian Federation was going to make such a statement. This is November and December 2020.

And that statement, in my understanding, contradicted the trilateral declaration of November 9, 2020. Next, in 2021, the events of Sotk-Khoznavar took place, Azerbaijan invaded the territory of the Republic of Armenia, we naturally appealed to the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation on this issue, moreover, we have a different legal treaty base with Russia, separate from the CSTO. The response was zero.

Moreover, I want to draw your attention to the events of Sotk-Khoznavar. I had resigned at that time, the National Assembly was dissolved and elections were scheduled for June 20, that is, if I am not mistaken, my resignation came into effect on May 10 or 11. After that, or during those days, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia visited Armenia, went from Yerevan to Baku, and from Baku to Moscow. I just say the chronology without meaning anything. And Sotk-Khoznavar took place. There was a great possibility that the Armenian government would react differently, as a result of which elections would not take place in Armenia, which would actually mean the dissolution of the Republic of Armenia.

We understand its political consequences, don't we? At that time, we were accused a lot of not doing the right thing, but we understood that the task of dissolution of the Republic of Armenia was set. Zero reaction from CSTO and zero reaction from Russia. Moreover, even then, our opposition said that we did not apply well enough, we should have applied under another article instead of that one, that's why there was no reaction.

And there is another accusation that the Armenian army did not fight, why should the CSTO fight? After that, the events of November 2021 took place. At that time, the Armenian army fought. Again zero response from CSTO and Russia, after which a declaration was signed between Russia and Azerbaijan in February 2022, which said the following: Relations between Azerbaijan and Russia are raised to a strategic level on the basis of recognizing each other's territorial integrity and inviolability of borders. The parties undertake not to perform such actions, which, according to the interpretation of the other party, would contradict their national interests. After that, the Parukh events take place in Nagorno-Karabakh. Zero response from Russian peacekeepers. After which, in 2022, by the way, the following happens: the special representative of the Russian Foreign Minister Khovaev visits the region with proposals. And among those proposals is the following: let's postpone the issue of the status of Nagorno Karabakh. We say we agree. Khovaev hands over that document to us in August and goes to Baku to hand over that document.

Khovaev’s next visit to the region takes place on September 11 or 12, 2022. He goes to Baku first. By the way, we say we agree. Notwithstanding these precedents, if such a proposal is made, we agree with this proposal. Azerbaijan rejects that proposal in an unofficial way, and to get an official answer, Khovaev visits the region on September 11 or 12, 2022. First he goes to Baku and then he comes to Yerevan. In other words, when Khovaev arrives in the Republic of Armenia, Azerbaijan attacks Armenia. Again zero response from Russia despite our official requests and zero response from CSTO. Moreover, by saying zero reaction, I don't mean that the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not comment on the situation, clearly, saying reaction, I mean a reaction regarding the security support provided by the agreements.

And on October 6, 2022, based on the Alma-Ata declaration we record our readiness to go to peace with Azerbaijan. And we record between Armenia and Azerbaijan what Russia recorded between itself and Azerbaijan, that is, the reaffirmation of the provisions of the Alma-Ata Declaration took place. And that was the only way to reaffirm the territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia. Was I able to describe the cause and effect relationships? In other words, essentially, what was the problem with the CSTO? It turned out that the problem with the Collective Security Treaty Organization was that they said, let us come, bring observers. We said: if observers come, what should they do? There was no answer.

And secondly, we say confirm the zone of responsibility of the Collective Security Treaty. The Republic of Armenia is a member of the CSTO, right? The Republic of Armenia is a zone of responsibility of the CSTO, confirm it, what is that zone of responsibility, because we have a situation where that zone of responsibility has been violated. The basis of our agreements was that the sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia is a red line for the CSTO and the Russian Federation. We say the red line has been violated, they say no, as if the red line was been violated. We say: very good, here is paper, here is pen - draw the red line you say, where does it pass? Moreover, we say that if you do not agree with our interpretation, there is no problem, you draw that red line with your hand, let's understand where that red line passes. They say we can't draw that red line. It means that you don't have a red line in Armenia, what should you do when you come to Armenia?

Petros Ghazaryan - By the way, the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation said that the agreements of November 9 were not fulfilled mainly because of Armenia.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan - I will advise the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation to take the trilateral declaration of November 9 and read it, including point 8. In other words, let's put the 9th point aside, let them read up to the 8th point, see who has not fulfilled what obligations. In other words, is is written in the trilateral declaration of November 9 that Azerbaijan should attack Nagorno Karabakh, and during that time the Russian peacekeepers should be in hiding?

I would like to draw attention to one circumstance again: the peacekeeping troops of the Russian Federation were sent to Nagorno Karabakh based on the decision of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. And in that decision of the Federal Assembly, it is written that the peacekeeping troops of the Russian Federation are there to protect the civilian population. Where is the civilian population of Nagorno Karabakh now?

Petros Ghazaryan - They also blame us, they say that when we reach the stage of concretely signing the unblocking of communications, Armenia steps back.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan - There is no such thing, at least three times there was a paper that we said we are signing right now, and the logic of that paper was what we are actually recording today in the "Crossroads of Peace" project. The "Crossroads of Peace" project is also, of course, very good as a project, it is very positive, but why did we make the "Crossroads of Peace" project public? Because obligations and positions were attributed to us? We negotiated the "Crossroads of Peace" from the first day, this was our position. Now we published that "Crossroads of Peace", so that it is clear to everyone what we want and what we don't want, because including Azerbaijan and other forces were trying to convince the whole world that Armenia refuses to unblock communications in the region. We said publicly, we're ready for this, today.

Petros Ghazaryan - Why don't we continue negotiations on Russian platforms?

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan - It's not like we are not going to continue negotiations on Russian platforms, but I said a little while ago: The trilateral declaration of November 9 should be read, should it be read or should it not be read?

Petros Ghazaryan - Is this directly linked to not going to the negotiations?

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan - It is not that we do not go to negotiations. Look, what are we saying? We are saying this is a trilateral declaration, in fact, there is nothing on the ground today that corresponds to the trilateral declaration.

Petros Ghazaryan - We are also accused of wanting to "nullify" that statement.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan - I'm sorry, but I said, let's read that statement and see what's happening in the area related to that statement. It was the developments that "nullified" the trilateral declaration of November 9, we did not do it, our signature is there, but now has anyone read the trilateral declaration of November 9, is anything written there exist in reality today? If they want us, they ask us a question about point 9, we don't have any problem about point 9. The "Crossroads of Peace" project accurately expresses point 9 of the trilateral declaration of November 9. Now let's look at points 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 and see if there is anything in reality. I'm sorry, but I'm saying that with the decision to send a peacekeeping force to Nagorno Karabakh, the Russian Federation has assumed specific obligations.

Petros Ghazaryan - In the end, they say that they are more observers, not peacekeepers.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan - With that, they nullify the trilateral declaration of November 9 and we should not be blamed for it.

Petros Ghazaryan - Mr. Prime Minister, at what stage is the negotiation process now? Are we moving to a bilateral format and is the Karabakh issue closed or not? Is everything over?

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan - Look, after this conversation, you ask that question again at the end, we have been talking for more than an hour, what were we talking about?

Petros Ghazaryan - Do we want anything now or not?

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan - We want the sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence, statehood and democracy of the Republic of Armenia, because in 2018, that is also, by the way, one of the next nuances, I said: I am the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia and the state interests of the Republic of Armenia must guide us. By the way, I would like to say the following that, for example, it is said that there were forces who used the Nagorno Karabakh issue to prevent the accomplishment of statehood in Armenia. What does this mean? The interpretation of this is very important. It means something very simple. All of us, starting with me and ending with my predecessors, invested 70-80 percent or the lion's share of the resources of the Republic of in the issue of Nagorno Karabakh.

The Republic of Armenia did not have foreign policy, it had a Nagorno Karabakh policy, the Republic of Armenia did not have a security agenda, it had a Nagorno Karabakh security agenda, etc. and so on. Do you understand what I mean? No one told us that our statehood should not be accomplished. A situation emerged when most of our country's resources that should be used for the accomplishment of the state, on creating the Republic of Armenia, we invested in creating the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh. We just did not take into account that the creation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic according to the 1993 resolutions of the UN Security Council, the Lisbon summit, I can list more, I'm just saying briefly, according to the results of the 1999 Istanbul summit, according to the Madrid principles, with negotiation packages of 2016, it was impossible. Do you understand that we have set a task, we have spent our resources on solving a problem, the solution of which, from the beginning, has been prevented by the entire international community.

Petros Ghazaryan - I was not talking about the restoration of the Karabakh state, I am talking about the people who have lived there for centuries.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan - Our policy is that the rights of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh should be protected. Our policy is as follows: we say, if the people of Nagorno-Karabakh realistically do not have the right or opportunity, or desire to return to Nagorno-Karabakh, our policy is for them to stay in the Republic of Armenia, live, create and act in the Republic of Armenia. Moreover, in order not to repeat the mistakes I listed in the previous period, now the field is very clear, it is open, Azerbaijan says if you want the return of the people of Nagorno Karabakh, rights, security and etc., there is no problem, let's also record the rights of Azerbaijanis who emigrated from the Republic of Armenia in the peace treaty.

Of course, we can add to it the right of return of the Armenians of Nakhichevan, the right of return of the Armenians of Baku, the right of return of the Armenians of Sumgait, the right of return of the Armenians of Kirovabad, again the right of return of Armenians from many places, but here the issue is in the following, what logic are we pursuing? Are we now gathering resources to go to a new conflict, or are we gathering resources to go to peace and use those resources to establish a state in Armenia? In my opinion, this is the right way. And what I could not say in 2018, 2019, 2020, even 2021, I am saying now.

Petros Ghazaryan - Another topic is the state institutions of Karabakh. I recently listened to Serzh Sargsyan, he says that the state cannot disappear with one signature, the government is not eternal and these institutions must function. There are many who argue that these state institutions should function in Armenia.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan - Invite Serzh Sargsyan, let him answer.

Petros Ghazaryan - I have invited, but he doesn't come.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan - What should I do?

Petros Ghazaryan - The negotiation process, Mr. Prime Minister.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan - There is some mobility in the negotiation process. The negotiation process, by the way, is also related to the question rgarding platforms. The negotiation process should have some predictability. And now yes, there should be negotiations and it is very important that these negotiations be based on the principles already agreed upon. I mean the three principles agreed upon at the Brussels platform. We imagine the peace process like that and the negotiation process, yes, continues, including in an online mode, because you know, we have given Azerbaijan our proposals, now we are waiting for their response. By the way, let me say that they accused us that we delayed for two months. We need to address that, what was the reason for it, because our proposals were ready and in the near future, constant meetings were planned, and we should, naturally, that...

Petros Ghazaryan – Personally?

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan - No, the matter is not doing it personally, but the situation is developing, and also a certain understanding should be formed, these principles, etc. Our negotiation package was delayed because Azerbaijan rejected four meetings in a row, when the meetings were part of the process of transferring that negotiation package. But even now, I consider that the negotiations are continuing on the text of the peace treaty, because if it is not possible to discuss face-to-face now, that work is also a negotiation, although there are contacts at the working level, the contacts that we talked about, you know, there can be also new contacts.

Petros Ghazaryan - Thank you.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan – Thank you.